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Abstract: 
Following David Cameron’s election as leader of the Conservative Party in late 2005, 
a series of initiatives suggested that he was seeking to reposition the Conservative 
Party, or perhaps to introduce some new thinking to the Party and to align it with 
interests and issues that it had not been linked with since at least the start of the 
Thatcher period. At the time, views among commentators varied about whether this 
was a genuine attempt to change the Conservative Party, including through a more 
compassionate approach to some social groups and problems, or whether it was 
simply designed to ‘detoxify’ the Party and to make it electable once more. 
However, many observers were unconvinced that the five years of the Coalition 
government saw significant evidence of the ‘compassionate’ ideas that Cameron and 
others sought to highlight prior to the 2010 general election. This article explores a 
number of possible reasons for the apparent disappearance of compassionate 
Conservatism in relation to social policies under the Coalition government. It 
suggests that rather than any one explanation, drawing upon a number of 
interpretations may provide the best understanding of the role and impact of 
compassionate Conservative ideas from 2010 to 2015. 
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Following David Cameron’s election as leader of the Conservative Party in December 
2005, he and a number of other leading Conservatives sought to portray the Party as 
different, at least in some respects, from the ways in which it had been perceived 
under his immediate predecessors. Against wider arguments and positioning 
associated with Conservative modernisation (Garnett, 2010; Hayton, 2010; Bale, 
2012; Griffiths, 2014; Kerr and Hayton, 2015), one area where that was particularly 
the case was in relation to social issues and policies  (Bochel, 2011; Hayton and 
McEnhill, 2014; Page, 2014; Williams, 2015), so that on topics such as the NHS, 
inequality and social mobility, gender and family structure, Cameron and his allies 
argued that the Conservative Party recognised and would respond to the concerns of 
the public in a different manner. However, the nature and extent of any new 
approach have been questioned, along with the record of the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition government in taking a more ‘compassionate’ approach in its 
social policies (for example, Beech and Lee, 2015; Bochel and Powell, 2016). 
 
This article briefly traces the apparent re-emergence of compassionate 
Conservatism, before exploring seven possible explanations of what happened to it 
under the Coalition government of 2010-15. It suggests that while each of the first 
six has merits, a more complete understanding of the nature and role of different 
aspects of compassionate Conservatism as part of the wider modernisation project 
under Cameron can be gained by reflecting upon the variety of interpretations of it, 
the interests and audiences within and outside the Conservative Party that 
‘compassionate’ ideas emerged from and were aimed at, and how they were 
reflected (or not) in policy. 
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The strange re-emergence of compassionate Conservatism 
Attempting to define compassionate Conservatism under David Cameron is 
problematic, not least because a range of other terms were also used, broadly 
interchangeably, by leading Conservatives, their critics, and commentators, including 
‘modern’, ‘progressive’ and ‘civic’ Conservatism. For some, it also had resonance 
with arguments about compassionate conservatism in the United States (for 
example, Béland and Wadden, 2007; Olafsky, 2000). As the focus of this article is on 
the presentation by the Conservative Party of an apparently more ‘compassionate’ 
face on social issues, that is the umbrella term used here. 
 
For three decades following the Second World War, the Conservatives were broadly 
seen as supporting the idea of the welfare state and generally ‘progressive’ 
approaches to poverty and social justice, although there were also recurring 
attempts to make social provision more efficient and to diminish the risks of 
dependency. Under Thatcher and Major the influence of the New Right meant that 
the welfare state was seen to have failed in many respects, including through 
creating a culture of dependency, and undermining the work ethic and a sense of 
personal responsibility, resulting in a greater emphasis on the market, and 
individuals and families themselves, in seeking to alleviate poverty. While some of 
these ideas fed into New Labour’s approach from 1997-2010, for the Conservatives, 
elements of their policies and rhetoric under the Thatcher and Major governments 
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made it difficult for them to counter accusations that they were an uncaring, or in 
the words of Theresa May, ‘nasty’ party (May, 2002). 
  
After 1997, William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith, and to a lesser extent Michael 
Howard, appeared to attempt to embrace more socially liberal and inclusive policies 
towards the start of their leaderships, but each soon moved back to the right (Bale, 
2011; Bochel, 2011). The Party therefore fought the general elections of 2001 and 
2005 largely on the basis of ‘traditional’ Conservative concerns, such as crime, 
immigration and Europe (Butler and Kavanagh, 2002; Kavanagh and Butler, 2005). 
  
Following David Cameron’s election as leader, a series of initiatives suggested that 
he was seeking to introduce new thinking to the Party, and to align it with interests 
and issues that it had not been linked with since at least the start of the Thatcher 
period (McAnulla, 2010; Page, 2010; Bochel, 2011; Griffiths, 2014; Kerr and Hayton, 
2015). For example, in speeches Cameron appeared to make the case for a new 
approach, including to poverty (2006c) and anti-social behaviour (2006b), and 
highlighted a commitment to the NHS (2006a); he created six policy review groups, 
only one of which was directly concerned with economic matters, while one focused 
on social justice, chaired by Iain Duncan Smith; and in January 2009 he launched the 
idea of ‘progressive Conservatism’ at the Demos think tank, talking about using 
Conservative means to achieve ‘progressive ends’, such as a fairer, more equal and 
safer society (for example, Robinson and Twyman, 2014).  
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Of course, Cameron’s approach was not new. David Willetts (1992) had pointed out 
that there were two strands to modern Conservatism – the commitment to the free 
market and the trust in community, and argued for the development of ‘civic 
Conservatism’ (Willetts, 1994; 2005a). He asserted that it was not sufficient for the 
Conservatives to be ‘a bunch of backward looking people who want to recreate 
British society as it was in the 1950s ’ (Willetts, 2005b), and suggested that a ‘new 
Conservatism’ should combine a commitment to a strong economy with social 
justice (see also Willetts, 2005a). Notably, in 2002, following his ‘epiphany’ in 
Glasgow, Duncan Smith had set out a vision of ‘compassionate Conservatism’, aiming 
to reform public services and help ‘the vulnerable’ (Seldon and Snowdon, 2005). He 
established the Centre for Social Justice in 2004, which was to play a significant role 
in providing the underpinnings for many of the Conservatives ’ arguments on poverty 
and social justice. 
  
Although the bulk of the parliamentary Conservative Party at this period displayed 
largely ‘Thatcherite’ views (Bochel and Defty, 2007), there were a number who 
sought to argue for a different approach. In 2007, two MPs, Greg Clark and Jeremy 
Hunt, published a pamphlet, Who’s Progressive Now?, in which they claimed that 
progressive values underpinned the Conservative Party under David Cameron. At the 
same time, other thinkers, such as Jesse Norman (for example, Norman and Ganesh, 
2006; Norman, 2009), were also producing their visions of a compassionate 
Conservatism. 
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This claim to a different approach to social issues reflected other developments 
under Cameron (Bale, 2011; Kerr and Hayton, 2015), such as a recognition of the 
challenge of environmental change, and the creation of an A-list for parliamentary 
candidates. Indeed, it can perhaps be seen as part of a much wider campaign, 
including to appeal to potential Liberal Democrat supporters (McGrath, 2009), while 
also helping provide a critique of what the Conservatives portrayed as Labour’s 
‘failed’ and ‘statist’ approach to tackling poverty and enhancing social mobility (as, 
for example, with Kruger, 2007).  
  
Cameron and his fellow modernisers arguably pursued a twin track approach, 
attempting to distance themselves from their predecessors and to challenge the 
perception of the Conservatives as the ‘nasty party’, while still appealing to 
traditional Conservative supporters (see, for example, McAnulla, 2010; Buckler and 
Dolowitz, 2012; Griffiths, 2014), so that while talking about tackling poverty, 
supporting the NHS and climate change, they were also promoting long-standing 
Conservative views on subjects such as crime, family structures and personal 
freedom, and taking responsibility away from the state and giving it to individuals , 
families and communities. Even before dropping the commitment to match Labour’s 
public expenditure plans, they saw limited government and lower taxes as part of 
the solution. They argued, therefore, that such an approach would involve ‘a 
dramatic decentralisation, a big shift in emphasis… from the state to society’ 
(Cameron, 2006c), and emphasised the role of the voluntary sector, including in 
tackling poverty.  
  
  8 
  
Whatever happened to compassionate Conservatism? 
 A number of commentators have suggested that the approach of the Conservatives, 
and indeed the Coalition government as a whole, was not particularly 
‘compassionate’ (for example, Griffiths, 2012; Wright, 2012; Eaton, 2014; Patrick, 
2015; Bochel and Powell, 2016), and that, similarly, the wider ‘modernisation’ 
project can be seen as a failure (Dommett, 2015; Kerr and Hayton, 2015). The 
remainder of this article explores what happened to compassionate Conservatism 
during that period. While there is a significant body of work on the Conservatives 
and the Coalition government, providing a variety of valuable insights, including into 
the ideological underpinnings and internal politics of the Conservative Party and the 
government, not all of it relates directly to the themes considered here, with, for 
example, the theme of ‘compassion’ frequently being overlooked. Drawing upon 
much of that work, and focusing primarily on the development of government 
policy, rather than ideology, this article identifies six initial possible explanations, 
and suggests that a seventh, considering them together, may assist in understanding 
the fate of ‘compassionate’ Conservatism under the Coalition:  
  
1. It was primarily an electoral tool. This could be seen as consisting of two 
separate but related elements: an intention to ‘detoxify’ the Conservative 
brand; and an attempt to attract (the ‘median’) voters; 
 
2. Compassionate Conservative ideas were largely restricted to a relative small 
(perhaps elite) group, primarily located within the parliamentary Party; 
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3. Ideas that came under the broad banner of ‘compassionate’ Conservatism 
originated from more than one group within the Party, and these had in 
many respects quite different foci and views; 
 
4. Compassionate Conservative ideas were largely overwhelmed and pushed off 
the policy agenda by ‘events’, most notably the financial crisis and its 
ramifications; 
 
5. The ideas underpinning compassionate Conservatism reflected particular 
interpretations of ‘compassion’; 
 
6. To some extent, like redistribution under New Labour, compassionate 
Conservatism was there, but it was not much talked about; 
 
7. Finally, compassionate Conservatism might best be understood by reflecting 
upon more than one of these. 
 
Clearly, the internal politics of the Coalition had an impact on the government’s 
policies, and those dynamics have been reflected in consideration of Conservative 
statecraft (for example, Hayton, 2014; Gamble, 2015; Heppell and Seawright, 2015). 
However, for the most part it would be hard to argue that compassionate 
Conservative ideas on social policy were held back by Liberal Democrat resistance, 
and this is broadly reflected in the literature (for example, Beech and Lee, 2015; 
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Seldon and Finn, 2015; Bochel and Powell, 2016). While interesting, the internal 
politics of the Coalition and their impact upon policy are not, therefore, discussed 
here, unless of direct relevance to the shape of policy. 
 
As noted above, ‘compassionate Conservatism’ is used here as an umbrella term to 
cover those positions, that implied, explicitly or implicitly, a somewhat different 
approach on a variety of social issues from that which was underpinned primarily by 
a neo-liberal approach to economic and social policy, and indeed from Thatcherism. 
Obviously, each of these terms is problematic. For example, Robinson and Twyman 
(2014) note that ‘progressive’ has something of an ideological meaning, being 
associated in the UK with ideas of social justice, and state intervention. However, it 
also has a temporal meaning, and the two do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. 
Indeed, they note suggestions that ideas of ‘progressive’ politics may have originated 
with economic liberalism, rather than social liberalism, and that Margaret Thatcher 
also sought to use the language of progress. Similar points could be made with 
reference to the other words and phrases used in these debates. In addition, while a 
more precise definition might in some respects be advantageous for analytical 
purposes, leading Conservatives, their opponents, and indeed other commentators, 
tended to use the variety of terms largely interchangeably, albeit sometimes with 
particular emphases, or used different terms to describe the same thing. This article 
argues, therefore, that an understanding of compassionate Conservatism under the 
Coalition requires a recognition that it, and many related ideas, were, at times, 
either by accident or design, vague and amorphous. 
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1. Compassionate conservatism was primarily an electoral tool 
 As Buckler and Dolowitz (2012) highlight, political parties constantly adapt their 
policies and rhetoric as a normal part of democratic competition, and while this 
generally results in relatively small shifts, at times this may be more radical. 
Unsurprisingly, given the long period in Opposition, some have argued that 
Cameron’s emphasis on compassionate Conservatism was largely, although not 
necessarily entirely, designed to help make the Conservatives electable again, not 
least by seeking to portray the Party as having moved on from the Thatcher era. 
  
Griffiths (2014), for example, highlights the context against which Cameron became 
Conservative leader. In late 2005 the Conservatives had suffered a third successive 
election defeat, had become ‘contaminated’ as the ‘nasty party’, were associated 
with scandal and were divided over Europe. Francis Maude (2005) argued within the 
Party that ‘change is self-evidently needed’, noting the loss of support among 
women, younger people and the large conurbations outside London. In the 
leadership contest Cameron was widely seen as a ‘moderniser’, who would reform 
the Party, in contrast to his opponent, David Davis, who was seen as more in line 
with Thatcherite ideas. Having become leader, Cameron sought to change the 
Party’s image, including over the environment, some social issues, and the NHS. As 
the Conservatives took the lead over Labour in opinion polls, some, understandably, 
came to see Cameron as dragging the Party back to the centre and to electoral 
success. However, Griffiths concludes that ‘Cameron’s account of progressive 
conservatism was part of a change of image, not substantively of policy or ideology: 
as such, it is firmly on the right of British politics ’ (p. 38). 
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On similar lines, Bale (2012) argues that while, as leader of the opposition, Cameron 
appeared to have ‘endlessly avowed enthusiasm for the centre ground’, supported 
the NHS and claimed to value public sector workers, ‘if one scratches beneath the 
surface appearance of centrism that he initially believed was vital to securing 
electoral victory, Cameron was and is ultimately no less of a Thatcherite than the 
vast majority of his colleagues ’ (p. 89), and suggests that this was demonstrated 
even before May 2010 when ‘he reverted to orthodox type in response to the 
domestic consequences of the global economic crisis ’ (p. 89). Hayton (2014), too, 
asserts that Cameron’s distancing of the Conservatives from Thatcherism was ‘more 
symbolic than substantial’ (p. 8), and that the Conservatives’ modernisation strategy 
was largely an attempt at detoxification, including ‘by association with language… 
not traditionally linked to the party’ (p. 9) (see also, Hayton, 2015). 
  
Page (2015a), too, suggests that when Cameron became leader he and his closest 
associates felt that ‘the construction of a new, softer, social narrative was necessary 
to ‘detoxify’ the Conservatives and to highlight how the Party’s agenda in this sphere 
differed from the overly statist strategy of New Labour’ (p. 130). For Page (2014), the 
progressive elements of Cameron’s conservatism includied: a more relaxed approach 
to diverse lifestyles; a toning down of the anti-state rhetoric associated with neo-
liberal approaches; and a recognition that the state could play some role in 
protecting people from poverty and disadvantage (for example, Letwin, 2002; 
Willetts, 2002). He suggests that in the attempts to dispel the idea that the 
Conservatives were uncaring, great importance was paid to the role of voluntarism 
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and civic institutions in creating the ‘Big Society’, initially appearing to draw on ideas 
such as those of Blond (2010), together with conditional state support for those who 
were unable to provide for themselves. McAnulla (2010), too, notes that one of the 
effects of Cameron’s anti-statism was to make the Conservatives ’ approach to issues 
such as social justice and decentralisation distinguishable from New Labour’s 
approach, while it may also have contributed to making traditional Conservative 
ambitions palatable to the post-Blair electorate. 
  
Heppell (2013) argues that, following the failure of the core vote strategy at the 
2001 and 2005 general elections, Cameron’s supporters believed that a repositioning 
of the Party was necessary. For some, this modernisation involved symbolic changes, 
attempting to pull the Party away from Thatcherism, and moving on to new policy 
ground. In that sense, he suggests that Cameron was replicating Blair’s strategy. 
  
From these perspectives, therefore, two related but separate aims can be identified 
from the strategy of highlighting compassionate Conservatism. Firstly, there was the 
attempt to detoxify the Conservative Party, as reflected, for example, in Cameron’s 
statement, following his election as Conservative leader, that ‘there is such as thing 
as society’, which deliberately contrasted with Thatcher’s claim (albeit often taken 
out of its full context), that ‘there is no such thing as society’. Secondly, there was an 
attempt to counter New Labour’s position by bringing the Conservative Party 
towards the political centre on issues such as the NHS and social divisions, while also 
making clear a difference between the parties on the role and responsibilities of the 
state, and of individuals, communities and society. Hodkinson and Robbins (2012) 
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argue that in their 2010 general election manifesto the Conservatives sugar-coated 
‘their agenda for “public spending control” with the compassionate one-nation 
rhetoric of “we are all in this together”’ (p. 64), while McAnulla (2010) suggests that 
prior to the 2010 general election Cameron had not only ‘moved the Conservatives 
onto the broad territory staked out in New Labour’s third way’ (p. 311), but also 
contended that they were best placed to defend third way themes. Even following 
the election, his move to establish a coalition with the Liberal Democrats appeared 
to strengthen his claim to be interested in governing in ways that transcended 
traditional dividing lines. 
  
One other thing that may have helped sway interpretations of the Conservative 
Party in Opposition was the involvement of newer think tanks, such as the Centre for 
Social Justice, Policy Exchange and ResPublica, in addition to longer established 
groups, such as the Institute of Economic Affairs and the Adam Smith Institute. Pautz 
(2013) suggests that this was a way of reaching new audiences and bringing new 
ideas into the Party, provided ideological support for the modernisers  and recruiting 
grounds for personnel, and allowed the development of policy outside the party 
machinery. However, their influence remained uncertain, and, other than the Centre 
for Social Justice, they were far from the only or even the major shapers of ideas, let 
alone policy. 
  
The combination of symbols and substance, and the different arguments and 
assertions made by the advocates of a new direction, as well as the unwillingness to 
produce precise promises and commitments that might allow the development of 
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critiques and alienate potential allies, meant that, as Bale (2013) notes, Conservative 
modernisation ‘was always heavier on diagnosis than on prescription’ (p. 135), and 
made the extent of change hard to assess. The lack of precision also meant that it 
could recognise that society and social mores had changed, and the Party could 
therefore be urged to end its war on single parents; but, at the same time, could see 
society as ‘broken’, with many of its problems being rooted in family breakdown and 
poor parenting, so that there was the clear impression that such hostilities had not 
in fact ended. He also highlights the ambiguities of Conservative modernisation 
around public services and public expenditure. Until the financial crisis there 
appeared to be a view among Conservative modernisers that promises of tax cuts 
and consequent restrictions on public spending had failed to persuade voters that 
the Conservatives could be trusted to run public services in the way that many of 
them wanted them run. However, the financial crisis allowed the Conservatives to 
drop their commitment to matching Labour’s spending plans and return to an 
agenda of spending cuts. Bale (2013) therefore argues that Conservative 
modernisation was not simply a shallow attempt to gain votes, but neither was it a 
noble cause that was betrayed by cynics or blown off course by events; rather its 
lack of development was a result of its original ambivalence and contradictions, 
which were always likely to be more exposed when the Party was in office. Indeed, 
he notes that some elements of the socially liberal agenda, such as same sex 
marriage and ring-fencing overseas aid spending, were pursued, sometimes at a cost 
to the reputations of their advocates, including the Prime Minister himself. 
 
  16 
Even once in government, compassionate Conservatism might be seen as having 
played a valuable role for the Conservatives, not least in terms of the rhetoric 
helping restrict the efficacy of some of the arguments of the Labour Party, and 
indeed their Liberal Democrat Coalition partners, and in the attempts of the 
Chancellor, George Osborne, in particular, to use ‘welfare’ to highlight differences 
with Labour.   
  
2. Compassionate Conservative ideas were largely restricted to a relatively small 
group, primarily located within the parliamentary Party  
 
Others have argued that the Cameronite tendency was a relatively small and elite 
group (Rawnsley, 2009; Kirkup, 2012), with the Conservative MP, Nadine Dorries, 
describing Cameron and Osborne as ‘two arrogant posh boys’ (BBC, 20121), and in 
many ways this reflects other interpretations of the development of the modernising 
tendency within the Conservative Party. Indeed, Bale (2012) argued that the gap 
between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats in the Coalition government 
was larger than some on the Conservative side had hoped, because the number of 
Conservatives willing and able to reach across the divide was so small. While 
sceptical about the motives for and extent of Conservative modernisation, Hayton 
(2014) notes that for some ‘modernisers’, working with the Liberal Democrats 
appeared to provide the possibility of completing the transformation of their party. 
However, the degree of resistance to change within the Party is also noted by Page, 
who, reflecting on Peter Lilley’s attempt in 1999 to persuade the Conservatives to 
adopt a more compassionate approach, notes that it ‘only served to harden the 
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resolve of those neo-liberal Conservatives who believed that any concerted attempt 
to distance the party from the Thatcher legacy would be counter-productive as well 
as treacherous’ (2015a, p. 121), and that the furore over the speech persuaded the 
then leader, Hague, not to pursue a more progressive approach on social issues. 
  
Indeed, until and even under Cameron’s leadership, support for a more socially 
inclusive approach to lifestyle choices, let alone a ‘softer’ approach to social policies 
more generally, was limited, with, for example, the parliamentary Party opposing the 
Labour government’s repeal in 2003 of Section 28 of the Local Government Act 
1988. Even under the Coalition, attempts to take a more liberal line saw 
considerable opposition, with 130 Conservative MPs rebelling over the introduction 
of same sex marriage in 2013. 
 
Heppell’s (2013) findings, drawing on division lists and early day motions, and on 
public comments by MPs, reinforce the view that Cameron and the modernisers 
were in a significant minority, with less than one-third of the Parliamentary 
Conservative Party endorsing social liberal positions, and fewer than one-quarter of 
Conservative ministers being social liberals, although he also suggested that the 
2010 cohort of MPs were more likely to hold such views.  
 
Interviews on the attitudes to welfare of MPs during 2004-5 (Bochel and Defty, 
2007) found that among Conservative MPs, while, compared with the 1980s (Bochel, 
1992), there was still considerable support for a minimalist approach to state 
provisions, there was more support for a more active role for the state in improving 
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people’s lives, and for government in building communities and improving life 
chances. MPs from the latter group stressed the need to combat poverty, 
particularly among children and older people. However, there were limits to the 
support for a role for the state, with, for example, none of those interviewed feeling 
that general taxation should be increased to pay for welfare provision. Similarly, 
fewer than one in ten Conservative MPs felt that the benefits system was effective in 
getting money to people who needed it. While some of these views appeared to be 
in part a reaction to and recognition of New Labour’s policy dominance at the time, 
there was a small group who clearly felt that the Conservative Party had been 
making the wrong arguments, and that it should seek to distance itself from the 
policies and rhetoric of the Thatcher and Major governments. However, they 
appeared to be largely isolated individuals (several, indeed, said that they did not 
talk to their colleagues about these topics), rather than a coherent grouping. 
Nevertheless, around the time of David Cameron’s election as leader, a number of 
them did emerge among the modernisers. In contrast, interviews with sixteen 
Conservative MPs from the 2010 intake found their attitudes on social policy issues 
closer to those of Conservative MPs from the 1980s, with, for example, a re-
emergence of ideas about those who are ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ of state 
support, and the need to target support towards the ‘genuinely disabled’, and with 
half identifying the risks of dependency as a major challenge (Bochel and Defty, 
2014), a rather different picture from that described by Heppell (2013), as noted 
above, although perhaps reflecting different policy areas . Conservative peers, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, tended to have views that had more in common with the 
policies of the Conservative Party in the Thatcher period than with the 
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compassionate or modernising tendency in the House of Commons (Bochel and 
Defty, 2010). 
 
This lack of enthusiasm for some compassionate Conservative ideas was also 
apparent in the Party outside Parliament. A survey of Conservative Party members in 
2013 found, for example, that they placed themselves on average at 8.4 on a left-
right scale, with 0 as very left wing and 10 as very right wing, compared with David 
Cameron, who they placed at 7.0, and Conservative MPs, who they placed at 7.9 
(Bale and Webb, 2013). UKIP was placed at 9.1. While Bale and Webb found that 
views on issues varied, they described social conservatism as ‘pervasive’ (p. 5), 
although, equally, there was no desire to see cuts in spending on the NHS. However, 
Webb and Childs (2011) suggested that among two of the three ideological 
tendencies that they identified within the Conservative Party, Liberal and Traditional 
Conservatives (the third being Thatcherite Conservatives), there was some sympathy 
for progressive views on social issues, and that depending on the issues that he was 
seeking to address, Cameron might be able to put together different coalitions of 
support from among the three groups. 
 
It is also possible to argue that the views of both Conservative MPs and members 
aligned with those of the public in some respects, but differed in others , with a 
number of studies having suggested that public attitudes towards the poor, and 
particularly the unemployed have hardened in recent years (for example, Taylor-
Gooby, 2013; Baumberg, 2014), while there remains a strong commitment to state 
provision in a wide range of areas (Defty, 2016).   
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3. The ideas that came under the broad banner of compassionate Conservatism 
originated from different groupings within the Party, and in many respects 
these had quite different foci and views 
 
 Potentially covering some of the same ground as 5, below, this argument can be 
made from two perspectives. Firstly, as noted above, a variety of different terms 
were used to describe perceived changes of emphasis in the Conservative Party, and 
the broad and interchangeable use of these, by both politicians and commentators  
(see also Dommett, 2015; Kerr and Hayton, 2015), was likely to lead to the conflation 
of different ideas and perspectives. Secondly, there may have been very real 
differences between the proponents of these approaches, even if they were 
frequently using the same words and even focusing on the same social problems and 
groups.  
  
The tendencies reflected in the development of compassionate Conservative ideas 
draw upon very different philosophical and ideological backgrounds and different 
political imperatives, including, potentially, the ‘borrowing’ of ideas associated with 
elements of the Republican Party in the United States around the late 1990s and 
early 2000s (although Norman and Ganesh [2006], for example, specifically distance 
their ideas from the ‘compassionate conservatism’ of George W. Bush). This poses a 
number of potential questions, not least around exactly what was being talked 
about. For example, while some of the ideas of Willetts, Duncan Smith and Cameron 
might all have been seen as showing some degree of compassion, and to have varied 
  21 
somewhat from a ‘true’ Thatcherite agenda, they were frequently applied to 
different issues and elements of society, and it is far from clear to what extent 
Cameron’s ideas were the same as Willetts’ or Duncan Smith’s, let alone Blond’s 
‘Red Toryism’.  
  
Griffiths (2014) differentiates Cameron’s progressive conservatism from One Nation 
conservatism and Red Toryism, arguing that from Disraeli to the 1980s, One Nation 
conservatism involved progressivism as social justice, and used the state to achieve 
its ends, rather than cutting back the state. He suggests that the ‘Red Toryism’ of 
Blond (for example, 2010) and his think tank, ResPublica, on the face of it appeared 
closer to the Cameron position in its view that Britain is ‘broken’ and with some 
emphasis on local and community responses. However, while Cameron did appear at 
the launch of ResPublica, he stayed only briefly, and it is not clear that Blond’s 
influence was ever more than ephemeral. Griffiths points out that Blond’s proposed 
responses, including recapitalising the poor, never made it into Conservative policy, 
and were a long way from the policies pursued by the Coalition government, 
although the idea of the greater use of mutuals to provide public services did appear 
to survive until the early years of the Coalition. Blond’s Red Toryism may therefore 
be seen as different, in blaming economic liberalism, as well as the state, for 
undermining structures such as church, family and civil society organisations, from 
other Conservatives who do not accept that there is a contradiction between 
neoliberalism and a good society (for example, Willetts, 2005b; Letwin, 2003; 
Osborne, 2009). 
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Wiggan notes that, unlike Red Toryism, the ‘self-defined progressive conservatism’ 
(2011, p. 38) of leading Conservative politicians was useful precisely because it did 
not necessitate a break with neoliberalism. Rather, it allowed the Conservatives (and 
indeed the Coalition government) to ‘voice concerns about poverty and social 
justice, while pursuing welfare reforms based on traditional Tory commitments to 
self-reliance, independence and the market’ (p. 38). A similar argument might be 
made about the work of Norman (Norman and Ganesh, 2006; Norman, 2009), which 
provided intellectual support for some of Cameron’s rhetoric and even policy 
development, including by highlighting a need for decentralisation, voluntarism and 
public service, while at the same time criticising some of the policies of previous 
Labour and Conservative governments. It is unsurprising therefore, that Bale (2013) 
points out that Conservative ‘modernisation’ could be interpreted very differently, 
with, for example, the socially liberal acceptance of single parents standing against 
‘broken’ society and ‘problem’ families, and some aspects of multiculturalism against 
the reiteration that Britain is a Christian country.  
  
Two of the main exponents of compassionate Conservatism were Cameron and 
Duncan Smith. While interpretations of Cameron’s beliefs differ, Buckler and 
Dolowitz (2012) suggest that he consistently emphasised two principles: trust in 
people to act for themselves; and a shared responsibility to maintain the social 
fabric; although they note that these can be subject to a variety of ideological 
interpretations. Cameron was arguably generally both consistent and progressive in 
relation to elements of social liberalism, particularly around sexual orientation and 
lifestyles, where he took a more tolerant line than many of his predecessors. In his 
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early days as leader he also criticised the Labour government for its failure to tackle 
poverty and inequality. Page (2011) suggests that Cameron sought to portray his 
party as modern and progressive, seeking ‘to create a cohesive and tolerant society 
in which individuals would take greater responsibility for their own well being, 
philanthropy would flourish, civic society would be reinvigorated and poverty and 
inequality would become less well entrenched’ (p. 35; see also Hickson, 2008; 
Garnett, 2010). Given the divisions within the Conservative Party, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that Beech (2015) notes that on social issues Cameron and some of his 
fellow modernisers felt much more comfortable with the Orange Book Liberal 
Democrats than with many of their own parliamentary colleagues, and that while 
the election in 2005 of Cameron as leader may have been a triumph for the social 
liberals within the Party, ‘social conservatism is still a key philosophical position for a 
majority of Conservative MPs’ (p. 7). Indeed, in government, particularly around 
employment and social security, it was arguably the ideas of Duncan Smith, together 
with pressure for public expenditure cuts, that drove the Conservatives’ agenda, 
with the work of the Centre for Social Justice on the ‘broken society’ having been 
influential. And, for Duncan Smith, as discussed below, compassionate Conservatism 
in many respects appears to draw upon very traditional Conservative views, 
including around individual responsibility and the idea of the family, while his 
‘compassion’ reflects an intolerance of ‘dependency’. 
  
It is also possible to see elements of compassionate and progressive Conservatism as 
being concerned with redefining the relationship between citizens and the state, 
including more volunteering and greater use of philanthropy. Hodkinson and 
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Robbins (2012) suggest that rather than simply being the antithesis of ‘big 
government’, the Big Society was an attempt ‘to redefine the relationship between 
citizens and the state’ (p. 64) through reforming the public sector and the role of the 
state, promoting community empowerment and encouraging philanthropy. Such a 
perspective arguably fits with Cameron’s Big Society rhetoric, particularly around the 
2010 general election, where he argued that the state ‘must help families, 
individuals, charities and communities come together to solve problems ’ (Cameron 
2009). Wiggan (2011) argues that civic Conservatives advocate less state 
intervention, preferring a strengthening of the social bonds of society, so that people 
may be more likely to rely on ‘themselves and their families, or will turn to charities 
and community organisations to tackle social problems at the local level ’ (p. 28).  
  
4. Compassionate Conservatism was overwhelmed/pushed out by ‘events’ 
 
Given the timings, it might be possible to suggest that compassionate Conservatism 
was pushed off the agenda by the financial crisis  of 2008, the public deficit following 
the rescuing of the banks, and the consequent perceived need for massive cuts in 
public expenditure. Perhaps the key question, therefore, is whether the financial 
crisis provided an excuse for the Conservatives to strengthen their neo-liberal 
arguments, extending them beyond economic policy into areas of social policy, or 
whether the crisis was more problematic, in that it drove the Party off its previously 
desired course. 
  
  25 
There is certainly an argument that Cameron’s compassionate approach was already 
being watered down even before the 2010 general election, whether because of the 
impact of the financial crisis, and the perceived need for greater reductions in public 
expenditure, because the compassionate approach was perceived as less necessary, 
or for other reasons. By the time of the election the compassionate approach had 
become much less central in Cameron’s speeches, with economic policy and the 
deficit being the Conservatives ’ central issues. It is arguable that ‘following the 
banking crisis, the narrative changed’ (Page 2015b, p. 71), with the Conservatives 
blaming the Labour government for its addiction to statism, its profligacy with public 
spending, and its failure to adequately regulate the financial sector, and, as Bale 
(2013) puts it, the Conservatives ’ promise to match Labour’s public expenditure 
plans was ‘shredded’ in favour of massive cuts in public expenditure (see also 
Dommett, 2015; Gamble, 2015; Williams, 2015). 
  
In 2010, the Programme for Government made clear the primacy of deficit 
reduction, not only in aiming to reduce it through cuts in public spending, rather 
than increase taxes, but highlighting in the statement at the end of the document, 
that, ‘The deficit reduction programme takes precedence over any other measures in 
this agreement…’ (p. 35). This emphasised the dominance of the neo-liberal 
economic approach over most elements of compassionate Conservatism (perhaps 
with limited exceptions, such as aspects of greater social tolerance) (Vail, 2014), 
suggested that the government’s ambitions for compassion were perhaps limited, 
and made it all the more unlikely that some of the things that the Conservatives had 
previously emphasised, such as ending child poverty, would figure significantly in the 
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policies of the Coalition government. Indeed, as Kerr and Hayton (2015) note, given 
the Conservatives’ desire to radically reduce the size of the state through austerity 
measures, it was perhaps immediately questionable whether the newly formed 
narrative of a more socially liberal and compassionate party was sustainable. 
Nevertheless, some within the Conservative Party, including Iain Duncan Smith and 
George Osborne, continued to use the language of compassion, fairness and social 
justice, although in practice policy, and social security policy in particular, whether as 
a result of financial pressures or not, headed in a more neo-liberal direction. Indeed, 
many commentators have suggested that in most, although perhaps not all, areas of 
social policy, the Liberal Democrats did not act as a significant brake on the neo-
liberal aspirations of their Conservative partners (for example Beech and Lee, 2015; 
Seldon and Finn, 2015; Bochel and Powell, 2016). 
  
Electoral and internal pressures, perhaps particularly in relation to the 
Conservatives’ core vote, the challenge of UKIP in the run-up to the 2015 general 
election, and to some extent the manoeuvring of senior figures for a future 
leadership election, also had an impact. For example, in addition to the financial 
crisis, the decline in public support for working-age claimants (Park et al, 2012, 2014; 
Deeming, 2014) may have helped encourage the Conservatives to move away from 
parts of the more compassionate narrative they had developed since 2005. The rise 
of UKIP, providing a political alternative to the right, meant that there was pressure 
on the Conservatives to take a fairly hard line in terms of rejecting tax increases and 
limiting social security payments (other than to pensioners). Similarly, immigration 
remained an issue upon which the Conservatives continued to take a hard line, at 
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least rhetorically, if rather powerlessly, as a result of the demands of EU 
membership. In addition, Labour’s slight shift to the left under Miliband may have 
made it easier for the Conservatives too to move somewhat away from the centre 
ground. 
  
Yet, despite this, and in addition to some areas of social liberalism where, as already 
discussed, Cameron did largely maintain his pre-election position, there were other 
areas of social policy where the Conservative Party, as part of the Coalition 
government, did arguably take a somewhat different line from some of its 
predecessors, including the commitment to protecting NHS spending, although this, 
perhaps like the relatively benevolent treatment of pensioners (see also 6, below), 
may have reflected the Conservatives ’ perceptions of electoral realities as much as a 
commitment to a compassionate approach.  
  
5. The ideas underpinning compassionate Conservatism reflected particular, and 
sometimes different, understandings of ‘compassion' 
 
To some extent reflecting many of the arguments made above, it is worth noting 
that ‘compassion’ means different things to different people. One obvious example, 
is that for some compassionate Conservatives poverty may be seen as a bad thing, 
but also as requiring politicians to be tough to help people escape it; indeed, being 
compassionate may involve reducing or removing dependency, even if that is not 
what the individuals themselves might wish for, including, perhaps, drawing on a 
particular conception of individual morality (Crines, 2013). In a speech in Ottawa, Ian 
  28 
Duncan Smith (2015) gave perhaps his clearest explanation of what compassionate 
Conservatism meant for him. He argued that during the Thatcher and Major 
premierships, and after, the Conservatives had allowed themselves to be defined by 
a narrow number of policies, and had failed to apply their values to contemporary 
challenges. In setting up the Centre for Social Justice, he suggested that his purpose 
‘was to show that Conservatives cared about people trapped in dependency… 
spurred on by strong moral values of fairness, opportunity, and compassion’. 
Moreover, he argued that compassion is not about being ‘soft’, and while some 
might feel that it is the preserve of the left:  
 
‘I disagree. There is nothing compassionate about increasing dependency by 
spending more of taxpayers’ money to sustain someone in a lifetime on 
benefits. No, Conservative compassion is about getting someone back to 
work, taking the tough choices to move someone clear of the benefits 
system’.  
 
 
He also criticised the ‘sympathetic’ approach of the left, which he described as being 
‘to sustain the most disadvantaged on slightly better incomes’. Here, being 
‘compassionate’ is not the same as being ‘sympathetic’, and can involve being quite 
hard on people, albeit in what is perceived as in their own interests. The 
Conservatives’ use of rhetoric on welfare reform has been discussed by Hayton and 
McEnhill (2014), who note the continuity between New Labour and the Coalition 
around modernisation and incentivising work, but also the Coalition’s, and 
particularly the Conservatives’ use of arguments intended to induce fear (for 
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example, over failure to tackle the deficit), promote the view of a strong 
government, determined to act, and to highlight the dangers of welfare dependency. 
  
While some, such as Toynbee (2013), have argued that Duncan Smith had a second 
epiphany, and moved from compassion to brutality with his reform of benefits and 
the Work Programme, others, such as Bamfield (2012: 832) have described the 
Coalition government’s view of social justice as underpinned by the view that: 
 
‘far from seeking to maximise the position of those at the bottom, the moral 
imperative is to reduce state hand-outs to the poorest in society, lest they 
become trapped in a state of welfare dependency that erodes personal and 
social responsibility and destroys individual agency and moral autonomy’.  
 
On broadly similar lines, Page has suggested that for the Coalition government, 
‘progressive’ policies were ‘based on an equitable or proportionate, as opposed to 
egalitarian, form of social justice’ (2014, p. 24), and that this led to cuts in the living 
standards of many working age benefit recipients, and to attempts to introduce a 
‘simpler’ and ‘fairer’ benefit, Universal Credit, intended to ease the transition from 
benefits to paid work by giving a clear financial advantage to labour market 
participation. Williams (2015), too, points out that the New Right tradition in 
conservatism has emphasised equality of opportunity, individual freedom and 
associated ‘meritocratic’ principles, with ideas about social justice emphasising 
rewards for individual success, rather than egalitarian principles. 
 
Indeed, a number of Conservatives, such as Duncan Smith and Willetts, argued that 
rather than Labour’s ‘one-dimensional’ approach of relying on the benefits system to 
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combat poverty, more varied and wide-ranging measures were required to reduce 
the level of dependency upon the state (Page, 2011). For them tackling Britain’s 
‘broken’ society required drawing upon the whole community, rather than relying 
solely or mainly on the state. They also placed even greater emphasis than had New 
Labour on individual responsibility. As a result, and despite the greater use of socially 
inclusive language and the commitment of some Conservatives to equality for same-
sex couples, it is perhaps unsurprising that Hayton and McEnhill (2015) concluded 
that ‘the socially liberal character of the Conservatives under Cameron’s leadership 
is far from certain’ (p. 144). 
  
6. Compassionate Conservatism was present during the Coalition government, but 
was not much talked about 
 
 A somewhat different interpretation from those above moves away from the 
question of why compassionate Conservatism was not significant under the Coalition 
government. Instead, it suggests that it may have existed, but that, perhaps with the 
exception of same-sex marriage, it was not much talked about, as some might 
suggest that the New Labour governments were in some respects redistributive, but 
that they did not like to highlight it (Lister, 2001). 
  
Writing in The Daily Telegraph in December 2014, Peter Oborne suggested that ‘this 
Coalition has never banged the drum for its social revolution’, but that: 
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‘Cameron and Clegg have reshaped the relationship between individual and 
the state in a way which neither Margaret Thatcher nor Tony Blair ever dared 
to do… [and] Mr Duncan Smith has liberated hundreds of thousands of 
people from the humiliation of state dependency and given them the 
opportunity to live independent, responsible and fulfilling lives ’ (Oborne, 
2014).  
 
 
He argued that in the fields of school age education, welfare reform and 
employment, in particular, there had been major changes, but that the Coalition had 
been given little credit, not least because of what he described as Westminster’s 
obsession with the arcane details of everyday politics. Similarly, Michael Gove (2015) 
argued shortly before the 2015 general election that the Conservatives ‘are warriors 
for the dispossessed’, that inequality ‘remains the greatest social and political 
challenge of our time’, and continued to lay claim to the Conservatives being the 
progressive party, with David Cameron having governed ‘as a modern, 
compassionate Conservative’. 
  
It is certainly possible to identify a number of areas where compassionate 
Conservatives might claim some success. In addition to some of the social liberal 
ideas discussed throughout this article, the manifesto commitment to increase the 
UK’s international aid to the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GDP made by Michael 
Howard in 2005 was retained, and in education there was, of course, the 
introduction of the ‘Pupil Premium’, designed to give schools additional funding for 
‘deprived pupils’. However, the Liberal Democrats’ manifesto had also contained a 
commitment to a pupil premium. Early research on the impact of the Pupil Premium 
suggested that it had been of value when earmarked for spending on disadvantaged 
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pupils (Carpenter et al, 2013), although, in reality, the money was not ring-fenced at 
school level. In higher education, the introduction of £9000 tuition fees in England 
did not appear to have deterred pupils from poorer backgrounds. The protection of 
NHS funding might also be seen in some respects as compassionate, and as 
reflecting Cameron’s apparent commitment to the NHS prior to the 2010 general 
election, although the government’s reorganisation of the Health Service appeared 
to have little to do with compassion and more to do with marketisation. 
  
The protection of some areas of spending, meant, or course, larger cuts in others, 
and in particular working-age benefits, although there was some media discussion of 
a degree of opposition from the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Iain 
Duncan Smith (BBC, 2012b) (there were also suggestions that he supported further 
changes (for example, Mulholland, 2012)), and from the Liberal Democrats (for 
example, Syal, 2012). In many respects a major ‘cut’ resulted from the move from 
using the Retail Price Index to the Consumer Price Index for the uprating of benefits, 
tax credits and public service pensions, as CPI tends to be lower than RPI, followed 
by a cap on the uprating of working age benefits of one per cent per tax year. 
 
Perhaps the greatest changes were in relation to poverty and social security. In 
Opposition, Cameron had sought to distance the Conservatives from the rhetoric of 
the Thatcher period, and had, for example, accepted that poverty should be 
recognised in relative terms, and argued that the pursuit of social justice and social 
mobility were legitimate goals for the Conservatives. However, the Coalition 
government was clearly pessimistic about the role of the state in achieving social 
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ends, and that, together with the need/desire for public expenditure cuts, led to 
what many have seen as regressive rather than progressive impacts.  
  
The introduction of Universal Credit was intended to simply the benefits system, and 
to reduce benefit dependency, as well as giving financial assistance to low-paid 
workers. However, the roll-out was much slower than had been anticipated. The 
Coalition replaced Labour’s various welfare-to-work programmes with the Work 
Programme, seen as a more cost-effective way of providing support to those who 
were unemployed for more than nine months, using private, public or third sector 
organisations on a payment-by-results basis. Higher payments were given for those 
seen as likely to need more extensive support in finding a job, such as those 
receiving Employment and Support Allowance. Assessment for capability to work 
became an issue, particularly the handling of some of the work by private 
contractors, most notably Atos, which withdrew from the activity in 2014. Timmins 
(2015, 327) notes that ‘the work capability assessment proved so harsh and 
inaccurate that huge numbers of those turned down won on appeal and the process 
was subject to repeated revisions ’. But perhaps the most significant changes for 
current purposes were cuts in benefit levels for working-age claimants, with the 
introduction of a £500 per week benefit cap for claimant couples , and other 
reductions, including the withdrawal of the spare room subsidy and the abolition of 
the national Council Tax rebate scheme. During this period there was also a 
significant growth in the number of food banks and people using them (more than 
one million people in 2014/15 according to the Trussell Trust (2015)). 
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In relation to social care, one of the service areas most neglected by governments, 
the Coalition established the Dilnot Commission (the Commission on Funding of Care 
and Support), which recommended a cap on the maximum that individuals could be 
expected to pay for their care of £35,000, although the figure implemented was 
£72,000. And, despite the passage of the Care Act 2014, which emphasised 
prevention and the promotion of well-being, the position had arguably deteriorated 
further, not least as a result of the constraints on funding, so that ‘to get any help at 
all from local social care services requires a higher and ever-rising level of “assessed 
need”’ (Glennerster, 2015: 314). 
  
The Coalition did sometimes highlight austerity initiatives that hit better-off 
taxpayers, such as the tapered withdrawal of Child Benefit from families where one 
person earned more than £50,000, with no payment where an individual earns more 
than £60,000, but it is hard to argue that this led to a ‘fair’ sharing of the burden. In 
contrast, pensioners were protected from many of the negative impacts of austerity, 
with increases in the state pension and the retention of other benefits, such as the 
Winter Fuel Allowance, for older people. One of the other strands of Coalition policy 
in relation to what they saw as helping people on lower incomes, the raising of the 
personal allowance, came largely at the insistence of the Liberal Democrats, and, 
whether seen as compassionate or not, can therefore not be seen as arising directly 
from compassionate Conservative beliefs. 
  
7. Compassionate Conservatism was complicated and might be reflected in 
several of these interpretations 
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 As Page (2011: 39) has noted, ‘Conservative “support” for the welfare state has 
waxed and waned since the Second World War’, and has often been linked to 
calculations over whether it has been operating in ways that bolstered or threatened 
deeply held Conservative beliefs, such as freedom, responsibility, inequality, 
voluntarism and the family. Indeed, Cameron’s stance on social issues also served to 
suggest that while he supported the neo-liberal economic agenda of the previous 
Conservative governments, he realised that the Party had ignored the adverse social 
consequences of such change (Page, 2011). Beech (2015) has argued that Cameron’s 
position was one of liberal Conservatism, and indeed that the Coalition government 
was more liberal than conservative, although in reaching that position he also draws 
upon economic and foreign policy, and it is less clear that such a view might apply 
when the focus is primarily on social policy. It is also likely that, in the same way as 
New Labour was significantly influenced by Thatcherism and the 18 years of 
Conservative government prior to 1997, as well as by traditional social democratic 
thinking, in the run-up to the 2010 general election the Conservatives were affected 
by a variety of political and ideological influences, and that as a result there was 
something of a mix of ideas and policies within the Party at that time.  
  
Most, if not all, of the possible explanations for the rise and fall of compassionate 
Conservatism that have been considered above are potentially overlapping. And 
given the different aims of the ‘compassionate’ Conservatives, and the variety of 
influences upon them, it would be surprising if there were one simple interpretation 
for its fate. Instead, it is perhaps helpful to understand civic, compassionate, modern 
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and progressive forms of Conservatism both as rhetorical constructs that were 
intended to help the Conservatives back into government, and as real drivers for 
policy change. Even quite early on in his leadership, Finlayson (2007: 4-5) argued 
that Cameron’s strategy could be put down to cynical pragmatism, but noted that he  
‘combines his acceptance of contemporary standards in personal morality, and his 
embrace of do-gooder liberalism, with familiar Conservative commitments’ in what 
might be ‘an attempt to begun to shape the core of Conservative party ideology 
around a principle of social responsibility’.  
 
At the same time, however, there were, and continue to be, significant differences 
among those who have advocated such approaches, and also between them and 
much of the rest of the Conservative Party, much of which retains a strong 
attachment to the ideology and rhetoric of the Thatcher period. 
 
Conclusions 
Having tried under three successive leaders to maintain the Thatcherite faith, but 
with little electoral progress, it may, perhaps, have been almost inevitable that there 
would be at least a rhetorical change in direction for the Conservative Party. It is 
interesting to reflect on a speech from the Conservative Party leadership contest in 
November 2005, which argued: 
  
…Labour’s failures have hurt some people most of all. They are the 
people least able to absorb those failures. I think of the poorest, oldest 
and most vulnerable members of society… I want to build a 
Conservative Party that will rescue disadvantaged people from crime-
ridden estates and failing schools… Many people will be sceptical about 
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the Conservative Party presenting itself as a party that cares for 
society’s neediest members. I understand that… The conventional 
welfare state is letting these people down… We should turn to the 
voluntary sector, which has a far greater ability to take a holistic 
approach… Let me be direct with you. The rediscovery of social justice 
is what will take this party from opposition to government. Of that I 
have no doubt. 
 
The speaker was David Davis (2005). This suggests that at least some of the 
arguments about compassionate Conservatism would have been the same even 
without David Cameron as leader. In terms of David Cameron and the Coalition 
government, the arguments considered above suggest that each of the first six 
perspectives outlined in this article helps understand the reasons for the re-
emergence of compassionate Conservative ideas in the early 2000s. However, that in 
itself makes clear that the seventh, that compassionate Conservatism during that 
period was complicated and multi-facted, is the most useful. Indeed, the differences 
in and between the individuals and groups promoting such ideas, and  their 
motivations for doing so, also help explain why, following the financial crisis and the 
creation of the Coalition government, ‘compassionate’ ideas were reflected only to a 
very limited extent in policy. 
 
Finally, while the focus here has been on compassionate Conservatism and social 
policy under the Coalition government, the Conservatives’ manifesto for the 2015 
general election, with the highlighting of the positive impact of ‘difficult decisions’ 
(p. 5), including public spending cuts (Conservative Party, 2015), the subsequent 
Queen’s Speech, and the 2015 and 2016 budgets all suggested that without the 
‘shackles’ of coalition, the Party’s overall approach remained broadly similar, with 
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further implementation of deep and ongoing cuts in public expenditure, increasing 
marketization and an emphasis on both choice and individual responsibility. While 
the motives behind the resignation, in March 2016, of Duncan Smith as Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions, were questioned, his move raised additional questions 
about the extent and nature of compassionate Conservatism, including his querying 
in his letter of resignation whether enough had been done to ensure ‘we are all in 
this together’ (BBC, 2016), and whether austerity had largely overwhelmed the 
desire to create incentives to work in welfare reforms. In addition, the implications 
of the referendum decision in 2016 to leave the European Union, and the emergence 
of Theresa May as Prime Minister following David Cameron’s resignation, mean that 
despite the Conservatives’ attempts to emphasise ideas such as ‘fairness’ and to 
reclaim the ‘One Nation’ label (Seldon and Snowdon 2015; Bochel and Powell, 2016), 
the future of modern ‘compassionate Conservatism’  remains uncertain, at best.  
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